1. ON-CALL TIME IS NOT WORKING TIME WHEN THE EMPLOYEE IS FREE TO PERFORM OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC concerning particular aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as meaning that if, during a period of on-call time when an employee is not required to be present in person (except to handle emergency calls), he or she may carry out their own work. Such on-call time does not constitute working time in so far as the restrictions imposed on the employee do not objectively and significantly affect his or her ability to freely manage the time during which their professional services are not required.
2. TIME SPENT ON PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IS WORKING TIME
The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC concerning particular aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as meaning that the period during which an employee undergoes compulsory professional training that takes place away from his or her normal place of work, in the premises of the training provider and during which he or she does not perform their normal duties, constitutes working time.
3. COMPENSATION FOR A WORK ACCIDENT cannot be deducted FROM DISABILITY INSURANCE COMPENSATION
The Supreme Court has held that it is not possible to deduct damages from the compensation for a work accident paid out under the disability insurance policy that the employer is required to take out under a collective bargaining agreement, as they are not payments of the same category and the disability insurance compensation does not constitute a loss of earnings arising from the liability to be assumed by the employer.
4. Labour inspectorate REQUest FOR PAYMENT INTERRUPTS LIMITATION period for salary PAYMENT CLAIMS
The Supreme Court has held that the limitation period for an employee to claim payment of differences in salary is interrupted when the employee files a claim with the Labour Inspectorate, which in turn orders the employer to pay those amounts. This is because from the time that the claim is filed and until the order is issued, there is no evidence that the employee abandons his or her right to claim payment.
5. LIMITATION period FOR employment OFFENCES BEGINs WHEN THE employer'S INVESTIGATION ends
The Supreme Court has unified doctrine on the limitation period for misconduct in the workplace, establishing that it begins on the day the employer’s investigation into the misconduct concludes, regardless of whether the employee acknowledges the alleged misconduct. This is because the employee could change, deny or clarify his or her statement at a later date, and the investigation could uncover further details.
6. THE PROHIBITION OF COMPETITION BETWEEN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS ONLY applies during THEir original term and any agreed extension
The Supreme Court has unified doctrine by establishing that the prohibition of competition between collective agreements applies solely to the term of the pre-existing agreement, understood as the initial term provided for in the agreement or the extension agreed by the parties, but not to any subsequent extraordinary period of application (ultra actividad).
7. Employees who are TELEWORKing BECAUSE OF COVID-19 must be reimbursed expenses if existing teleworkers are paid them
The National Court has held that all employees who began to telework permanently as a result of COVID-19 are entitled to be reimbursed expenses derived from teleworking because there was a company-wide policy to reimburse permanent teleworkers for their expenses. The National Court considered that to deny this to the other employees would be discriminatory as they would be performing their work duties under the same conditions because of COVID-19 restrictions.