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Cartels are a surprisingly persistent feature of economic life. The temptation to rig the game in one’s favour is constant, particularly when demand conditions are weak and the product in question is an undifferentiated commodity. Corporate compliance programmes are useful but inherently limited, as managers may come to see their personal interests as divergent from those of the corporation. Detection of cartel arrangements can present a substantial challenge for both internal legal departments and law enforcers. Some notable cartels have managed to remain intact for as long as a decade before being uncovered. Some may never see the light of day. However, for those that are detected, this compendium offers a resource for practitioners around the world.

This book brings together leading competition law experts from 28 jurisdictions to address an issue of growing importance to large corporations, their managers and their lawyers: the potential liability, both civil and criminal, that may arise from unlawful agreements with competitors as to price, markets or output. The broad message of the book is that this risk is growing steadily. In part because of US leadership, stubborn cultural attitudes regarding cartel activity are gradually shifting. Many jurisdictions have moved to give their competition authorities additional investigative tools, including wiretap authority and broad subpoena powers. There is also a burgeoning movement to criminalise cartel activity in jurisdictions where it has previously been regarded as wholly or principally a civil matter. The growing use of leniency programmes has worked to radically destabilise global cartels, creating powerful incentives to report cartel activity when discovered.

The authors are from some of the most widely respected law firms in their jurisdictions. All have substantial experience with cartel investigations and many have served in senior positions in government. They know both what the law says and how it is actually enforced, and we think you will find their guidance regarding the practices of local competition authorities invaluable. This book seeks to provide both breadth of coverage (with a chapter on each of the 28 jurisdictions) and analytical depth for those practitioners who may find themselves on the front line of a government inquiry or an internal investigation into suspect practices.

Our emphasis is necessarily on established law and policy, but discussion of emerging or unsettled issues has been provided where appropriate.

This is the seventh edition of *The Cartels and Leniency Review*. We hope you will find it a useful resource. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of their firms, the editor or the publisher. Every endeavour has been made to make updates until the last possible date before publication to ensure that what you read is the latest intelligence.

**John Buretta**  
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP  
New York  
January 2019

**John Terzaken**  
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP  
Washington, DC
I ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND GUIDANCE

The legislation regulating cartel conduct in Spain is the Competition Act. The Defence of Competition Regulation implements specific sections of the Competition Act, including, inter alia, procedural questions related to the leniency programme. Furthermore, Spanish competition authorities are entitled to apply Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in cases in which restrictive practices potentially affect trade between EU Member States.

Competition rules in Spain are enforced by the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC). Certain regions also have authority to enforce the Competition Act in their respective jurisdictions.

Article 1 of the Competition Act establishes a general prohibition against any kind of agreement, decision or concerted practice that has as its object, or that may produce, anticompetitive effects in the market. The Competition Act refers explicitly to price-fixing, allocation of clients and market sharing as examples of restrictive practices. Such agreements, decisions or concerted practices may nonetheless benefit from an exemption if they improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress, subject to specific requirements. Furthermore, the prohibitions under Article 1 of the Competition Act do not apply to agreements resulting from the application of a law.
Agreements falling under the scope of Article 1 of the Competition Act that do not benefit from an exemption are illegal and void.

The Competition Act establishes the definition of a cartel as ‘any agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors which aim to coordinate or influence competitive behaviour in terms of prices, quantities, allocation of customers or markets and in general any other practice against competitors’. The former National Competition Commission (CNC) considered cartels as mere exchanges of sensitive commercial information between competitors.

The CNMC has declared the ‘fight against cartels to be its number one priority in competition enforcement’. Since the adoption of the current Competition Act in 2007, more than 60 cartels have been discovered and sanctioned in Spain, with total fines above €1 billion. In 2018, the CNMC issued four decisions sanctioning cartels. The CNMC has intensified its efforts in the detection of big-rigging conduct by means of the recent creation of an intelligence unit dedicated to identifying indicia of bid-rigging conduct based on the analysis of the data regarding the offers submitted in public tenders.

Spain’s leniency programme was introduced in February 2008. Note that leniency is only available to practices falling within the scope of the definition of a ‘cartel’. The leniency programme has been applied in 23 cases since its entry into force in Spain in 2008.

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9 Fourth Additional Provision, recently amended by Royal Decree-Law 9/2017 of 26 May (RDL 9/2017), which transposes into Spanish law the Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and the European Union (EU Damages Directive). RDL 9/2017 has eliminated the secrecy element previously required and broadened the practices included in this definition in line with the approach adopted at EU level.


11 See the press release published by the CNMC on 24 October 2017 regarding the conference about the 10 years of the adoption of the Spanish Competition Act.

12 CNMC decisions of 1 August 2018 in Case S/DC/565/15, IT Tenders; 19 July 2018 in Case S/DC/569/15, Recycled batteries; 7 May 2018 in Case S/DC/584/16, Media agencies; and 9 March 2018 in Case S/DC/578/16, Courier and packaging.

Furthermore, on 26 May 2017, the Spanish government enacted RDL 9/2017 implementing the EU Damages Directive. RDL 9/2017 introduces important amendments aimed at incentivising claimants to bring damages actions for antitrust infringements in Spain.

II COOPERATION WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The CNMC cooperates with the European Commission and other national EU competition authorities throughout the European Competition Network (ECN).

The ECN was created as a forum for discussion and cooperation between European competition authorities in cases involving the application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. The ECN aims to ensure the efficient division of tasks and the effective and consistent application of EU competition rules. In particular, the ECN competition authorities cooperate by:

a. the mutual exchange of information on new cases and expected enforcement decisions;
b. coordinating investigations where necessary;
c. mutual assistance on investigations;
d. exchanging evidence and other information; and
e. discussing issues of common interest. 14

In November 2012, the ECN published a revised model leniency programme setting out the treatment for leniency applicants in all ECN jurisdictions, including Spain. It also includes a uniform type of short-form application that can be used by leniency applicants in cases of multiple leniency filings in different ECN jurisdictions to ensure the marker if an application of immunity was filed with the European Commission.

International cooperation with authorities in other jurisdictions is usually implemented through agreements executed by the European Commission. In addition, on 6 November 2017, the CNMC entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.

Since Spanish regulations do not provide for criminal sanctions for competition infringements, 15 Spanish judges will be unlikely to accede to extradition requests from foreign jurisdictions.

Although RDL 9/2017 facilitates claimants’ access to relevant documents before substantiating the claim, this new mechanism should not be understood as creating a discovery system similar to that in Anglo-Saxon systems. Thus, no mechanisms for extraterritorial discovery are available.

14 The basic foundations of the functioning of the ECN are laid out in the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities and the Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities.
15 See footnote 30.
III JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENCES AND EXEMPTIONS

No special rules exist regarding extraterritoriality. Spanish competition rules apply to actions whose object, result or potential result is the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in all or part of the national market. The nationality of the undertaking is immaterial.

Regulation (EC) No. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Regulation 1215/2012) provides that persons domiciled in a Member State must, as a rule, be sued in the courts of that Member State. Nevertheless, it is relevant to take into account that when there are several defendants, a person may also be sued in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings in different Member States.16 This provision may be applicable in cartel cases in which the infringers may have their domicile in different Member States, allowing the claimant to initiate actions against several defendants in Spain if any of them is domiciled there.

Moreover, Article 7.2 of Regulation 1215/2012 sets forth an exception to that general rule in matters relating to tort, allowing the claimant to sue a person domiciled in one Member State in the courts of another Member State for the place where the harmful event occurred. The case law17 of the European Courts has clarified that victims of cartel infringements have the alternative option of bringing an action for damages against several companies that have participated in the infringement, either before the courts of the place where the cartel itself was concluded, or one specific agreement that implied the existence of the cartel, or before the courts of the place where the loss arose. That place is identifiable only for each alleged victim taken individually and is located, in general, at that victim’s registered office. Therefore, a claimant who is domiciled in Spain would be allowed to initiate actions before the Spanish courts.18

Foreign companies are subject to sanctions under Spanish competition provisions for antitrust infringements committed by their subsidiaries. In particular, under Article 61(2) of the Competition Act, the actions of an undertaking are also attributable to the undertakings or natural persons that control it, unless its economic behaviour is not directed by any such persons. It is nevertheless important to take into consideration the fact that, according to well-settled European case law, if a company is wholly owned by its parent company, there

16 Article 8.1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
17 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 21 May 2015, Case C-352/13 Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA.
18 Spanish courts confirmed in 2018 their jurisdiction to hear truck cartel claims, although the cartel meetings did not take place in Spain and the registered offices of the cartelist are not in Spain. As an example, Commercial Court No. 3 of Valencia has stated that the Valencia courts are best placed to rule on a case where the claimant was based in Valencia during the cartel and acquired the trucks through an authorised dealer that is also located in Valencia (Judgment of Commercial Court of Valencia No. 3 of 4 October 2018). In the same context, Commercial Court No. 12 of Madrid has ruled that it has international jurisdiction to hear the case and has deemed that private enforcement of national and European antitrust law based on a conduct that restricts competition falls within the competence of the commercial courts instead of the first instance courts (Judgment of Commercial Court of Madrid No. 12 of 12 September 2018).
exists a rebuttable presumption that the parent company dictated the economic behaviour of its subsidiary.\footnote{Although the presumption is theoretically rebuttable, in practice there are almost no European or Spanish precedents in which competition authorities have accepted arguments attempting to demonstrate the subsidiary’s autonomy.} The CNMC repeatedly cites this European case law in cartel cases\footnote{See former CNC decisions of 15 October 2012, in Case S/318/10, Paper envelopes exports; 24 June 2011 in Case S/0185/09, Fluid pumps; 2 March 2011 in Case S/0086/08, Professional hairdressing; 21 January 2010 in Case S/0084/08, Bath gel manufacturers; and 26 June 2014, in Case S/445/2012, Firefighting equipment. See also CNMC decisions of 22 September 2014 in Case S/0428/12, Pales and 28 July 2015 in Case S/471/13, Car manufacturers.} to extend the liability of cartel members to their parent companies.\footnote{The Supreme Court’s Judgment of 29 March 2012 in Sogecable and Audiovisual Sport/Tenaria confirmed that, when a company is wholly owned by its parent company, the CNMC may presume that the parent company determines the economic behaviour of its subsidiary. The Supreme Court also held that there is a rebuttable presumption of parent company liability when, \textit{inter alia}, the parent company holds the majority of the subsidiary’s voting rights or has the authority to appoint and remove members of the subsidiary’s board of directors.}

### IV LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

The leniency programme\footnote{The Competition Act specifically refers to ‘applications for the exemption from payment of the fine’ (Article 65) and ‘reduction of the amount of the fine’ (Article 66).} was introduced in Spain in 2007 by the Competition Act and entered into force in February 2008. In June 2013, the authority published a Communication on Leniency Programme aimed at providing further guidance to leniency applicants and increasing the transparency of its decisions.

Following the European model, the programme offers full leniency (immunity from fines) as well as partial leniency (reduction of the fine). The benefits of the programme are available not only to undertakings but also to individuals (whether because the original applicant is an individual or because the company requests that leniency be extended to its employees).

Only the first undertaking or individual who provides evidence that enables the CNMC to order an inspection or prove a cartel infringement will be eligible for full leniency, and this is subject to the condition that the CNMC does not already have sufficient evidence of the infringement.

Undertakings or individuals are eligible for partial leniency when they provide evidence of the alleged infringement that adds significant value to evidence that the CNMC already possesses (i.e., the new evidence makes it significantly easier for the CNMC to prove the infringement).

Immunity from or reduction of the fine will also be subject to satisfaction of the following requirements:

- full, continuous and diligent cooperation with the CNMC throughout the investigation;
- immediate cessation of participation in the infringement, unless the CNMC considers participation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of an investigation;
- no evidence relating to the application for the exemption has been destroyed;
there has been no direct or indirect disclosure to third parties, other than the competition authorities, of the fact of the evidence’s contemplated application or any of its content; and

e no measures have been adopted to coerce other undertakings to participate in the infringement. This last obligation is only required for full leniency applicants.

Full cooperation with the CNMC during the proceedings is the leniency beneficiary’s main obligation. Full cooperation implies that applicants must:

- provide the CNMC, without delay, with all relevant information and evidence relating to the presumed cartel that is either in the applicant’s possession or available to it;
- remain available to the CNMC to respond, without delay, to all requests that could contribute to establishing the underlying facts;
- facilitate interviews with the company’s employees and current executives and, if applicable, former executives;
- refrain from destroying, falsifying or concealing relevant information or evidence in relation to the presumed cartel; and
- abstain from disclosing the filing or content of the application for the fine exemption or reduction prior to notification of the statement of objections or such time as may be determined by the CNMC.

The CNMC applies elevated standards when determining whether undertakings have fully and continuously collaborated. In several cases in which the information provided by the undertaking had added value, the former CNC nevertheless withheld the benefits of the leniency programme from undertakings on the basis that it considered that they had not complied with their collaboration obligations under the programme. During the course of the proceedings, the applicant has the right to be informed about whether the authority intends to maintain the conditional immunity that has been granted.

It is important to bear in mind that the moment at which participants in a cartel reveal information (prior to or following the opening of an investigation) is highly relevant not only for immunity applicants (who must be the first to report the information) but also for undertakings or individuals seeking partial leniency. The range for the reduction of the fine imposed depends on that timing: 30 to 50 per cent for the second party revealing information, 20 to 30 per cent for the third party, and up to 20 per cent for the remaining parties.

The Communication on Leniency Programme sets out the information and documentation that has to be included in the leniency application. Although Spanish legislation does not have a marker system, the CNMC may grant, upon an applicant’s prior

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23 See CNC decisions of 2 March 2011 in Case S/0086/08, Professional hairdressing, and 23 February 2011 in Case S/244/10, Baleares ship operators.

24 The Competition Directorate must specify, on a reasoned basis, both in the statement of objections and in the proposed resolution, whether it is maintaining the conditional exemption that was granted, and progressively evaluate the applicant’s fulfilment of its cooperation duties during the course of the investigation. If the Competition Directorate believes such duties have been breached, it will so state and submit a reasoned proposal to the CNMC Council not to grant the exemption, so the applicant can submit the pleadings it deems fit on the matter.
justified request, additional time for submitting evidence about the cartel. Following the submission of the evidence within the agreed time limit, the filing date for the leniency application will be understood to be the date of the initial application.25

At the request of the applicant, oral applications for leniency may be accepted. To do so, a meeting has to be arranged at the CNMC offices and, after the recording has been transcribed, the declaration will be registered. The transcript’s entry date and time in the CNMC register will determine the order of receipt of that leniency application.

The filing of a request for immunity from a fine or a reduction application and all application data and documents will receive confidential treatment until the statement of objections is issued.26 Interested parties will then have access to that information,27 provided that this is necessary to submit a response to the statement of objections.

Private litigants may not request that the CNMC or other competition authorities produce materials submitted within the scope of a leniency programme.28 Indeed, RDL 9/2017 provides complete protection to the leniency statements and settlement submissions, which cannot be disclosed under any circumstances. As regards other evidence available in the CNMC’s file, national courts would be able to order the disclosure only after a competition authority has closed its proceedings, by adopting a decision or otherwise.29

V PENALTIES

The Competition Act establishes civil and administrative sanctions against undertakings that participate in a cartel. Spanish law does not establish any criminal sanction for infringements of competition regulations.30

Legal representatives and managers who have directly participated in the cartel can be sanctioned with a fine of up to €60,000. Although the CNMC had not traditionally applied this provision, in 2016 it changed its practice and since then it has imposed sanctions on legal representatives and managers in four decisions.31 The fines imposed ranged between €4,000 and €40,000.

Significant fines have been imposed in cartel cases, demonstrating the CNMC’s commitment to detecting cartels and sanctioning those involved.

Fines imposed on undertakings can be up to 10 per cent of the violator’s total turnover in the year preceding the imposition of the sanction. On 29 January 2015, the Supreme Court issued a judgment32 clarifying the interpretation of this limit.

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25 Article 46(5) of the Defence of Competition Regulation.
26 Article 51 of the Defence of Competition Regulation.
27 This access right does not include obtaining copies of any statement by the fine exemption or reduction applicant that has been specifically made for submission with the related application.
28 Article 15 bis of Law 1/2000 of 7 January on Civil Procedure (Civil Procedure Act).
29 Article 283 bis (j) of the Civil Procedure Act.
30 Nevertheless, some practices, such as bid rigging, may constitute a criminal offence if they relate to public tenders.
32 Judgment of 29 January 2015, Appeal No. 2872/2015, BCN Aduanas y Transportes SA.
On the basis of the proportionality principle, the Supreme Court held that:

\( a \) the 10 per cent limit on the annual turnover of a sanctioned company is the maximum sanction. This percentage is supposed to be the ceiling of a range within which the amount of the fine has to be fixed in proportion to the seriousness of the infringement. The final amount of the fine must be set within a range of between zero and 10 per cent according to the principle of proportionality. As a consequence, the turnover limit should only be triggered in the most serious infringements; and

\( b \) this percentage must be calculated over a company’s total annual turnover, including sales of products not affected by the infringement.

The Supreme Court also declared that the criteria contained in the Fining Guidelines adopted in 2009 by the former CNC are contrary to Spanish administrative and constitutional law. As a consequence, the fining method applied by the CNMC had to be modified to comply with the proportionality principle. The Supreme Court declared that the final amount of the fine should be established, taking into account the following criteria mentioned in the Competition Act:

\( a \) the size and characteristics of the market affected by the infringement;

\( b \) the market shares of the undertakings;

\( c \) the scope of the infringement;

\( d \) its duration;

\( e \) the effect of the infringement on the rights and legitimate interests of consumers or on other economic operators;

\( f \) the illicit benefits obtained from the infringement; and

\( g \) aggravating and mitigating circumstances in relation to each undertaking.

As a result, the CNMC adopted a new methodology to calculate the amount of the fines. On 6 November 2018, the CNMC published provisional guidance on the setting of fines explaining this methodology. Under the new system, the determination of the fine is a two-tier process.

\( a \) First, approximately 60 per cent of the fine corresponds to the application of the general penalty regime. It determines the infringement’s level of unlawfulness. It takes into account several factors, such as the particularities of the affected market, the market share of the companies involved, the infringement’s scope, the effect on consumers, users and economic operators, and whether multiple companies are involved.

\( b \) Second, approximately 40 per cent of the fine corresponds to the application of an individual penalty regime. It depends on the specific conduct of each company and considers factors such as the duration of the conduct or the individual aggravating or mitigating factors.

Based on these factors, the CNMC calculates a percentage that is applied to each undertaking’s overall turnover to determine the fine.

Afterwards, the agency reviews the final penalty to ascertain whether the amount is proportionate to the scale of the infringement.

If the undertaking benefits from a reduction following the application of the leniency programme, the reduction is applied to the final figure determined by application of these criteria.
The use of this methodology has not led to a reduction in the level of the fines imposed by the CNMC. Moreover, it has given rise to a great degree of legal uncertainty because undertakings cannot foresee the amount of the fine that they could be facing. To address this concern, the CNMC intends to publish new guidelines for the calculation of fines.

Spanish law does not establish any settlement procedure for cartel cases. Nevertheless, it is important to take into consideration that, in some cases, the CNC has granted significant (up to 15 per cent) reductions to undertakings that did not benefit from the leniency programme. This has occurred based on the mitigating circumstances of undertakings that admitted their participation in a cartel in their response to the statement of objections, and even in cases in which the CNC concluded that the undertaking had not complied with its collaboration obligations under the leniency programme. The CNMC has announced its intention to introduce a settlement procedure in line with the one applied at EU level in order to be able to apply significant reductions to the fines imposed on companies that cooperate and do not contest the existence of an infringement.

Finally, since 22 October 2015, natural and legal persons sanctioned for serious infringements that distort competition can be banned from contracting with public bodies for up to three years. This prohibition can be applied in addition to the penalties set out in the Competition Act. For the prohibition to be effective, the sanctioning decision must be final. No prohibitions have yet been imposed.

VI ‘DAY ONE’ RESPONSE

Law 3/2013 grants broad powers to CNMC officials to carry out unannounced inspections of companies’ premises. In 2017, the CNMC carried out eight inspections.

Under Spanish law, access to premises must be consented by either the occupants or a court by way of a warrant. Access to premises is only mandatory if authorised by a court through a warrant. In the absence of a judicial warrant, undertakings are entitled to deny access to their premises (although not to oppose the inspection, which is mandatory). In practice, the CNMC usually requests a warrant in advance to secure access to premises.

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33 CNC decisions of 19 October 2011, in Case S/226/10, Public tenders for roadway maintenance works and 5 August 2013, in Case S/380/11, Car rental.
34 CNC decisions of 2 March 2011, in Case S/0086/08, Professional hairdressing and 23 February 2011, in Case S/244/10, Baleares ship operators.
35 Act 40/2015 of 1 October on the Public Sector.
36 Inspections carried out during 2018 took place on 18 January, Railway electrification; 28 February, Tobacco; 28 March, School books; 17 May, Railway electrification; 30 May, Civil engineering; 4 July, Real estate construction; 25 October, Aquaculture; 18 December, Railway signalling.
37 Information contained in the investigation order prepared by the Competition Directorate for investigation or the warrant of the court must include the following information: the date of the inspection; the names of the CNMC officials who will be in charge of the inspection; the identification of the undertaking and the address of the premises subject to inspection; and the object of the inspection. It is important to verify this information is correct before allowing the inspection to be carried out. The Supreme Court (Judgment of 27 February 2015, Appeal No. 941/2015) has stated that inspection orders must have a degree of specificity, meaning that they cannot be defined so vaguely that they allow ‘fishing expeditions’, and they cannot simply quote the infringements set out in the Competition Act in abstract terms.
The Supreme Court has declared the inspection of a company’s premises illegal because the inspectors did not inform the company that a judge had rejected the CNMC’s application for a warrant and, therefore, the company’s consent to the inspection was deemed invalid.38

During the inspection, officials are permitted to seize and make copies of all documents (whether physical or electronic) located at the company’s premises (excluding private or legally privileged documents).39 Personal and privileged documents must be identified during the inspection.40 Some CNMC inspections have been annulled by the Supreme Court since it considered that officials had exceeded the original scope of the inspection orders, which constituted a violation of the fundamental right to inviolability of domicile.41

Officials may also address any questions to the company’s employees. Employees are legally obliged to cooperate with the inspectors by providing them with all information requested and answering all questions, unless the questions directly incriminate the company.42

In June 2016, the CNMC published an informative note regarding inspections, which contains a detailed description of the obligations of a company under investigation and the possible sanctions if it fails to cooperate.

Fines of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover in the previous year can be imposed on a company that by any means obstructs the inspection tasks of the CNMC. The former CNC imposed fines on several companies for breaching the duty to collaborate with the information request by submitting misleading or fake information.43

**VII PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT**

To date, there have been only a few cases regarding private litigation arising from antitrust infringements in Spain. However, the number of cases has increased significantly during the past year as a result of the enactment of RDL 9/2017 implementing the provisions of the EU Damages Directive.

RDL 9/2017 introduces significant changes in the Spanish regime, the main ones being:

a. increasing the limitation period from one to five years. This period is suspended from when a competition authority initiates proceedings until at least one year after the decision on an alleged infringement is made final;

b. introducing a presumption of harm in cartel infringements. As a general rule under Spanish law, to apply for damages, claimants are required to prove the causation of harm and its amount, and it was not always easy for them to have access to the evidence required to quantify the amount of the damages claimed. RDL 9/2017 sets out a presumption of harm in cartel cases and allows courts to estimate the amount

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39 The attorney–client privilege only applies to correspondence between clients and external counsel. It does not apply to correspondence with in-house counsel.
40 Spanish courts have confirmed that CNMC officials have broad powers to seize documents during inspections. In particular, it is the obligation of the undertaking alleging that a document is protected or falls outwith the scope of the inspection order to identify such documents and to provide proof of the protected nature of the same (see the Supreme Court Judgment of 27 April 2012 in Stanpa).
42 The CNMC usually requested access to web emails of employees by asking for their passwords to confirm whether the email addresses had been used for professional purposes.
43 See CNC decisions of 31 July 2012, in Case SNC/26/12, Mediapro and 31 May 2012, in Case SNC/19/12, CPV.
thereof if it is not possible to calculate the damages. These changes are expected to make it easier for claimants to obtain an indemnity. Claimants would be allowed to obtain full compensation of the damages suffered, comprising the right to be indemnified for actual loss and loss of profit, plus interest;

c introducing a presumption of harm to indirect purchasers. Spanish civil law states that the burden of proof in civil proceedings lies with the party that alleges the harm. Thus, indirect purchasers must provide evidence of the defendant's unlawful conduct, the causal link and the existence of harm and its quantification. In RDL 9/2017 this rule is reversed, introducing a presumption of harm in favour of indirect purchasers. It is relevant to mention here that Spanish courts have recognised the passing-on defence when considering a defendant's position in damage claims involving cartel infringements;

d introducing specific mechanisms to facilitate claimants' access to relevant documents before substantiating the claim. The pretrial disclosure process in Spain was rather limited and courts have been reluctant to award broad disclosures of documents to claimants. RDL 9/2017 modifies this regime and makes it easier for claimants to access evidence that is required to substantiate the claim. However, claimants must justify the request and provide reasonable available evidence to support a damages claim. They will also need to identify specific items of evidence or, at least, relevant categories of evidence. Thus, RDL 9/2017 does not foresee the introduction of a discovery system in Spain. Moreover, the party who requests access is expected to exercise sufficient caution to cover the expenses incurred by the defendant as well as any potential damage they may suffer as a result of the misuse of the information obtained. Specific protection for leniency statements and settlement submissions are guaranteed, as it has been until now, and specific mechanisms are foreseen to ensure the confidentiality of business secrets of entities called to reveal documentary evidence;

e making CNMC's final decisions declaring infringements of competition law binding on Spanish courts. A final decision made by any other Member State's national competition authority creates a presumption that a competition law infringement exists;

f extending the liability of parent companies for damage caused by their subsidiaries to civil proceedings;

g declaring the joint and several liability of all co-infringers in relation to damages caused as a result of anticompetitive behaviour. This principle of joint liability is exempted in cases involving small and medium-sized enterprises that meet certain requirements and beneficiaries of immunity; and

h declaring the effective compensation of the damages caused before the adoption of a decision by the CNMC as a mitigating factor for the purposes of setting the amount of the antitrust fines.

RDL 9/2017 has clearly fostered awareness among claimants and it has incentivised them to bring damages actions for antitrust infringements in Spain.

44 See Judgment of 20 February 2009 of Civil Court No. 11 in Valladolid in Gullón et al/Acor; Judgment by the Provincial Court of Madrid of 9 October 2009 in Nestlé España et al/Acor; and Judgments of the Supreme Court of 8 June 2012 in Acor/Gullón, 7 November 2013 in Nestlé España/Elvo Foods and 4 June 2014 in Endesa Distribución Eléctrica SL/Energía-VM Gestión de Energía.
The Civil Procedure Act sets out different ways to submit collective actions. The simplest type of collective action involves the consolidation of the claims of multiple plaintiffs, provided that there exists a link between all the actions through the same object or the same petition. Moreover, although class actions are not technically recognised under Spanish law, Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Act includes some provisions in relation to collective legal standing in cases that are limited to the defence of the interests of ‘consumers and final users’. Consumers’ associations have standing to protect not only the interests of their associates but also the general interests of all consumers and final users. This could be applicable to antitrust cases, particularly those involving the declaration of antitrust infringements or injunctions.

When a consumers’ association initiates a collective action under Articles 11(2) to (3), the admission of the claim will be made public.

VIII CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The CNMC published provisional guidance on the setting of fines in 2018. Moreover, the CNMC has changed its previous practice to include in the proposal decision that is submitted by the Competition Directorate to the Council the proposed amount of the fine to be imposed so that the parties would have the opportunity to submit observations thereto before a final decision is adopted. Also, several oral hearings before the Council have taken place in 2018. The CNMC has announced that it is considering the introduction of a settlement procedure that will mirror the one applied at EU level so that companies may benefit from significant reductions in the amount of the fine if they admit the existence of an infringement.

Finally, private litigation for antitrust infringements have significantly increased in Spain since the enactment of RDL 9/2017 and the number of cases bought before Spanish courts is expected to increase in the coming years.

45 The court would presume that such a link exists if the actions are based on the same underlying facts.
46 Collective actions in defence of the interest of consumers and end users fall into two categories depending on the degree of certainty as to the identification of the consumers or users affected by the claim.
• First, if a particular group of identifiable consumers or users is harmed by specific anticompetitive behaviour, the locus standi for defending the interests of that group would fall with consumers’ associations and the groups of affected consumers. In such cases, consumers or users whose interests may be affected must be informed by the plaintiff so that all potentially affected consumers may defend their interests in the civil proceedings at any time (opt-in clause).
• Second, if anticompetitive behaviour compromises the interests of a group of consumers or users that cannot easily be identified, the only entities with the standing to represent those interests in court are consumers’ associations that are ‘widely representative’. For this purpose, the courts will acknowledge that a consumer association is widely representative if it is a member of the Consumers and Users’ Council. In such cases, publication would be considered sufficient for all interested consumers to identify themselves. Spanish law establishes that the proceedings will resume after two months. Affected consumers or users who do not identify themselves to the court within that term will not be permitted to join the action, although they may nevertheless benefit from the case’s outcome. It is important to take into consideration that, in such cases, the judgment will be binding on all affected consumers and users, and not only on those who have appeared in the proceedings.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ALFONSO GUTIÉRREZ
Uría Menéndez
Alfonso Gutiérrez is a lawyer in the Madrid office of Uría Menéndez. He joined the firm in 1999 and became a partner in January 2005. He is currently a member of the EU and competition law department of the firm.

His practice focuses on EU and Spanish competition law. He is regularly asked to advise on EU and Spanish mergers in many different sectors (such as banking, energy, telecommunications, aviation, industrial products and pharmaceuticals).

Mr Gutiérrez frequently acts in litigious matters concerning the individual or collective abuse of a dominant position and the conclusion of restrictive agreements between competitors or non-competitors. He intervenes in many proceedings for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 1 and 2 of Spanish Law 15/2007 for the Defence of Competition. He also regularly represents clients before the European Commission in state aid cases.

He lectures and writes on competition law matters, and has repeatedly been nominated as a leading lawyer in competition and antitrust by specialist directories such as Chambers Global, PLC Which Lawyer? Yearbook, Best Lawyers and Who’s Who Legal.

ANA RAQUEL LAPRESTA
Uría Menéndez
Ana Raquel Lapresta is a lawyer in the Brussels office of Uría Menéndez. She joined the firm in 2009 and is currently an associate of the EU and competition law department.

Her practice focuses on EU and Spanish competition law. She has wide experience of advising clients in merger control proceedings, including international multifiling coordination. Ms Lapresta also has wide experience of representing clients in procedures before the European Commission, the Spanish competition authorities and the EU courts for the investigation of anticompetitive infringements, such as pan-European cartels, cases involving abuses of dominance and other restrictive practices and agreements.

Ms Lapresta has advised companies and associations on compliance programmes on competition matters relating to intellectual property and regulatory issues in a range of sectors, including financial, insurance, electrical and telecommunications.
About the Authors

URÍA MENÉNDEZ
Espace Meeûs
Square de Meeûs 40
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Tel: +32 2 639 64 64
Fax: +32 2 640 14 88
raquel.lapresta@uria.com

c/Suero de Quiñones, 42
28002 Madrid
Spain
Tel: +34 91 5 860 400
Fax: +34 91 5 860 403/4
alfonso.gutierrez@uria.com

www.uria.com