Expedited arbitration is here to stay: the 2026 ICC Rules and the EPP as a case study in procedural proportionality

International arbitration is often seen as a flexible and efficient way to resolve disputes. However, users still point to cost and delay as two of its main drawbacks. The 2015 Queen Mary University of London and White & Case survey ranked cost and lack of speed among arbitration's most serious perceived shortcomings, while also showing strong support for simplified procedures for lower-value claims.^[1] More recent data tells a similar story. The 2025 edition of the same survey found that expedited or fast-track arbitration procedures are the most popular way to make arbitration more efficient. Respondents said they choose these procedures mainly to reduce costs, get quicker decisions, and handle less complex or lower-value disputes in a proportionate way.^[2] This growing demand has prompted arbitral institutions to respond: expedited or fast-track procedures are now a standard feature of institutional arbitration.

This development is not a step back from procedural safeguards. When designed properly, expedited arbitration is not a weaker form of arbitration, but a more proportionate one. The key issue is not whether due process should be preserved – it must be – but how tribunals should give effect to the right to be heard when time, cost and complexity need to be kept within stricter limits. This approach is underpinned by the principle of procedural proportionality: the idea that the scope, time and cost of procedural choices should be proportionate to the value, complexity and urgency of the dispute. This principle has emerged as a guiding light in modern institutional arbitration design precisely because the procedural steps typically associated with standard arbitrations are not always necessary or appropriate for every case. For example, applying the same procedural framework to a multi-billion-dollar construction dispute and a straightforward commercial claim of moderate value serves neither efficiency nor justice.

The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC") offers a useful example. It introduced its Expedited Procedure Provisions (“EPP") in 2017, updated them in 2021, and most recently in 2026. On 29 January 2026, the ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR published a report titled Expedited Procedure Provisions - Eight Years On, along with a Toolkit for Arbitrators and a one-page factsheet (the “ICC Report", “ICC Toolkit" and “ICC Factsheet" respectively).^[3] This package is important because it brings together the applicable rules, practical guidance and eight years of case data. The 2026 ICC Arbitration Rules were subsequently published in May 2026 and entered into force on 1 June 2026^[4], applying to arbitrations commenced on or after that date. Among other changes, the 2026 Rules introduce a new Highly Expedited Arbitration Procedure (HEAP), increase the expedited threshold to USD 4 million, add an early determination mechanism, and remove mandatory Terms of Reference^[5].

The ICC was not the first institution to adopt expedited rules. Chinese arbitral institutions, including the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC") and the Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC"), introduced structured expedited procedures in the 1990s, and other institutions later developed similar mechanisms.^[6] The ICC's importance lies elsewhere: it was the first leading global institution to make expedited procedure the default route below a specified monetary threshold. That threshold was initially USD 2 million for arbitration agreements executed on or after 1 March 2017, increased to USD 3 million under the 2021 Rules, and rose to USD 4 million under the 2026 Rules for arbitration agreements concluded on or after 1 June 2026.

This default structure is significant. Under Article 32 of the ICC Rules, parties that agree to ICC arbitration also accept that Appendix V may apply, even where their arbitration agreement provides otherwise. In practice, this means that a clause calling for a three-member tribunal does not necessarily prevent the ICC Court from appointing a sole arbitrator in an EPP case. ICC data shows that, between 2017 and 2024, a sole arbitrator was appointed in 61 cases despite an agreement for a three-member tribunal. That is not just an administrative detail. It helps to reduce costs, streamline scheduling and limit the scope for tactical challenges.

The ICC model is neither rigid nor entirely discretionary. Appendix V sets out when the expedited procedure applies, based both on the amount in dispute and the date of the arbitration agreement. It also includes a safety valve: after consulting the tribunal and the parties, the ICC Court may decide that the EPP should no longer apply. The system therefore combines a default rule with an institutional mechanism for exceptions. This balance matters. The amount in dispute is a useful indicator of procedural complexity, but it is not a perfect one.

Four procedural features stand out. First, the case management conference must be held within 15 days of the file being transferred to the tribunal.^[7] Second, the tribunal has broad discretion to streamline proceedings, including by limiting written submissions, witness and expert evidence, and document production, or by deciding the case on documents alone.^[8] Third, the procedure is lighter than ordinary ICC arbitration, and the ICC Court may appoint a sole arbitrator despite any agreement to the contrary.^[9] Fourth, the award should, in principle, be issued within six months of the case management conference, subject to any extension granted by the President.^[10]

The broader institutional landscape is moving in the same direction, although not towards a single model. KCAB International's 2026 Rules, for example, distinguish between an expedited track with a six-month award period and a KRW 4 billion threshold – and a separate fast-track procedure – with a three-month deadline.^[11] The 2026 Rules of the Asian International Arbitration Centre (“AIAC") have a fast-track procedure for international cases below USD 3 million, also built around a six-month period.^[12] The 2025 Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC") include a streamlined procedure for claims up to SGD 1 million while retaining expedited arbitration.^[13] The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC") has increased its expedited threshold to HKD 50 million, effective 1 January 2026,^[14] and the 2022 Rules of the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC") provide for expedited proceedings below AED 1,000,000 with a three-month deadline.^[15] Even the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA") – long known for not having a specific expedited procedure for the arbitration as a whole – has proposed introducing expedited and fast-track procedures in its 2026 rules consultation.^[16]

These examples suggest that institutions are no longer competing only on reputation, fees or administrative capacity. They are also competing through procedural design. The key question is no longer whether an institution offers a streamlined process, but how that process is tailored to the value, urgency and complexity of the dispute – without undermining fairness or enforceability.

ICC data helps show how this works in practice. Between 2017 and 2024, the ICC administered 865 EPP cases, including a record 189 in 2023, and issued 461 final awards. Opt-in rates were 16%, while opt-outs were limited to 31 cases (3.6%). Notably, 5.5% of EPP cases involved parties opting in to the expedited procedure even though the amount in dispute exceeded the default threshold, suggesting that parties sometimes choose it voluntarily. The procedural data is equally telling. There was no document production in 79% of cases and expert reports were used in only 5.2%. Hearings took place in 54.4% of cases, with 63% of those conducted virtually or in hybrid form. No post-hearing briefs were filed in 70% of cases. Timing data is also telling: tribunals issued 63% of awards on or around the six-month deadline, and fees were reduced for delay in only 33 cases.^[17]

Two conclusions follow. First, expedited arbitration is not simply “truncated" arbitration. It is a form of arbitration in which procedures often treated as standard – such as document production, expert evidence, multiple rounds of submissions and post-hearing briefs – are treated as optional. Second, efficiency appears compatible with a reasonable standard of procedural protection. The ICC Report notes that, in preparing its findings, it did not identify any application to set aside the EPP award on due process grounds.^[18] That point should not be overstated, but is nonetheless significant. It suggests that procedural efficiency does not necessarily increase enforceability risk.

The due process issue therefore needs to be framed carefully. Expedited proceedings must not deprive parties of a reasonable opportunity to present their case. But that right does not extend to every procedural step typically found in standard arbitration. Article 23 of the ICC Rules reflects this balance: the tribunal and the parties must conduct the arbitration in a way that is both efficient and cost-effective, while ensuring that each party has a fair opportunity to present its case.^[19] Efficiency is not merely desirable – it is part of the tribunal's mandate. Due process operates as the limiting principle, not as a basis for adding unnecessary procedural steps.

This is where concerns about “due process paranoia" become relevant. The term describes a tribunal's reluctance to manage proceedings firmly for fear that an award might later be challenged or denied enforcement. In practice, this can lead tribunals to grant extensions too readily, admit late evidence, allow unnecessary procedural stages or otherwise tolerate inefficiency. Berger and Jensen argue that this caution is often overstated and propose a “procedural judgment rule" under which courts should defer to a tribunal's procedural management unless a clear line is crossed.^[20] The Singapore Court of Appeal adopted a similar approach in China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC, holding that alleged due process violations should be assessed against a standard of reasonableness and that courts should not interfere with rational procedural choices.^[21]

That said, the risk of genuine procedural unfairness should not be overlooked. While many due process objections are tactical or exaggerated, compressed timelines can genuinely impair a party's ability to present their case effectively in some circumstances. This is particularly the case when a party has to respond to complex technical or expert evidence within a very short timeframe, when key witnesses are unavailable during the relevant period or when tight deadlines coincide with practical difficulties – such as obtaining documents from third parties or coordinating across multiple jurisdictions. In such circumstances, rigid case management may deprive a party, in practical terms, of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Proportionate case management therefore requires not only a willingness to impose procedural discipline, but also the judgement to recognise when the circumstances of a particular case justify greater flexibility.

The practical implication is clear. Tribunals in expedited proceedings can take firm procedural decisions, provided those decisions are reasoned, even-handed and proportionate. They should not treat every refusal of document production, every limit on hearing time or every rejection of late evidence as a potential ground for annulment. The better view is that enforceability depends on whether each party had a fair and reasonable opportunity to present its case in the circumstances – not on whether the procedure mirrors that of a standard arbitration.

Proportionality is therefore the guiding principle. Efficiency and fairness are not necessarily in conflict. In fact, adding too many procedural steps can undermine arbitral justice by increasing cost, obscuring the key issues and delaying resolution. The task is to distinguish between procedural steps that are genuinely necessary for deciding the dispute fairly and those that are merely habitual. Tribunals should decide this early in the proceedings and revisit it only when this is necessary.

For that reason, expedited arbitration focuses on the early stages of the case. A compressed timetable does not manage itself. The tribunal's first communication and the case management conference should establish the procedural calendar, the number and scope of submissions, the approach to evidence, how to handle document requests, the need for witness or expert evidence, and whether a hearing is necessary. Counsel also have a role to play: expansive pleading strategies and late procedural manoeuvres are much harder to accommodate when the award deadline is measured in months rather than years.

The same logic applies to amendments and late evidence. Article 25 of the 2026 ICC Rules restricts new claims after the initial case management conference unless the tribunal gives permission, taking into account the nature of the new claim, the stage of the arbitration, any cost implications and other relevant circumstances.^[22] In expedited cases, late claims or evidence are not just inconvenient – they can undermine equality of arms and disrupt the timetable. Tribunals should therefore take a firm approach where a party seeks to expand the dispute after the procedural framework has already been set.

Speed cannot come at the expense of the award's quality. The ICC Toolkit emphasises that an expedited award should be self-contained, allowing an enforcement court to understand the tribunal's reasoning from the document itself.^[23] A shorter award may be appropriate, but it must still set out the issues, the parties' core positions, the tribunal's analysis and its conclusions. An unclear award may save time in the short term, but it can create enforcement risks further down the line.

The future is unlikely to lie in a single model of expedited arbitration, but rather in a more differentiated procedural framework. Standard, expedited, and ultra-fast tracks may coexist, with institutions refining the criteria for each. The 2026 ICC Rules have now concretely confirmed this direction by introducing HEAP as a three-month opt-in ultra-fast track under Appendix VI alongside the existing six-month EPP under Appendix V, irrespective of the amount in dispute. Some already distinguish between expedited and fast-track procedures, while others are experimenting with shorter deadlines for lower-value or less complex disputes. What matters is that these innovations are generally accompanied by clear commitments to procedural fairness. Institutions are not abandoning due process in the pursuit of speed; they are seeking to define the procedural minimum that is appropriate for each track.

Expedited arbitration is therefore best understood as making procedural proportionality the norm. Its success will depend less on having shorter deadlines than on how well tribunals make procedural choices: identifying key issues early, exercising firm control over evidence, setting realistic timetables and producing awards that remain clear despite the compressed process. Expedited arbitration is here to stay. Its long-term success, however, will depend not just on the rules themselves, but on whether arbitral institutions, tribunals, and lawyers are willing and able to make the process work in practice. This requires active case management, careful procedural decisions, and an ongoing commitment to keeping the process proportionate and efficient.

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^[1].  Queen Mary University of London and White & Case, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration (2015), pp. 7, 10.

^[2].  Queen Mary University of London and White & Case, 2025 International Arbitration Survey: The Path Forward: Realities and Opportunities in Arbitration (2025), pp. 17, 19.

^[3].  ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, Expedited Procedure Provisions - Eight Years On, 29 January 2026; ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, Toolkit for Arbitrators in Expedited Procedures (ICC, 29 January 2026); ICC, Expedited Procedure Provisions: Statistics 2017-2024, 29 January 2026.

^[4].  ICC, ICC Executive Board Approves Revised Rules of Arbitration, 23 March 2026; ICC, 2026 Arbitration Rules (entered into force 1 June 2026).

^[5].  ICC Rules 2026, Articles 30 (early determination), 32 (expedited procedure) and 33 (highly expedited arbitration), and Appendices V and VI.

^[6].  Y. Fang, “Examining the Practice of Expedited Arbitration in China: Strengths, Difficulties, and Prospects", in A. M. Anderson and H. Verbist (eds), Expedited International Arbitration: Policies, Rules and Procedures (Kluwer Law International, 2024), 327; G. Marchisio, “Recent Solutions to Old Problems: A Look at the Expedited Procedure under the Newly Revised ICC Rules of Arbitration" (2017) 1 ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 77.

^[7].  ICC Rules, Appendix V, Article 3(1).

^[8].  ICC Rules, Appendix V, Articles 3(2)-(3).

^[9].  ICC Rules, Appendix V, Article 2(1).

^[10].  ICC Rules, Appendix V, Article 4.

^[11].  Global Arbitration Review, “New Rules Set International Standards at KCAB", 19 January 2026; KCAB International Arbitration Rules 2026.

^[12].  Global Arbitration Review, “AIAC Amends Rules", 16 February 2026; AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026, Rule 7.

^[13].  Global Arbitration Review, “SIAC Launches Two Key Initiatives", 26 August 2025; SIAC Arbitration Rules 2025.

^[14].  HKIAC, “HKIAC Announces Expansion of Expedited Procedure, Updates Fees and Releases New Report to Enhance Transparency on Costs", 17 December 2025.

^[15].  DIAC Arbitration Rules 2022, Art 32.

^[16].  Global Arbitration Review, “LCIA Prepares for Rules Revamp" (12 March 2026); LCIA, LCIA Rules Revision Consultation (11 March 2026).

^[17].  ICC Report; ICC Factsheet.

^[18].  ICC Report.

^[19].  ICC Rules 2026, Arts. 23(1), 23(2) and 23(4).

^[20].  K. Berger and J. Ole Jensen, “Due Process Paranoia and the Procedural Judgment Rule: A Safe Harbour for Procedural Management Decisions by International Arbitrators" (2016) 32(3) Arbitration International 415; S. Menon, “Dispelling Due Process Paranoia: Fairness, Efficiency and The Rule of Law" (2021) 17 Asian International Arbitration Journal 1.

^[21].  China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC [2020] 1 SLR 695.

^[22].  ICC Rules 2026, Art 25; ICC Rules 2026, Appendix V, Art 1(1). Article 25 is a general ICC Rules provision, but it applies in expedited proceedings because Appendix V provides that the Rules apply unless Appendix V states otherwise. See also Appendix V, Arts 3(1), 3(2) and 4, on the early case management conference, streamlining powers and six-month award deadline.

^[23].  ICC Toolkit.